Iran-US: Khamenei’s contradictory rhetoric on negotiations

Op-ed views and opinions expressed are solely those of the author.

On November 18, during a meeting with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman at the White House, U.S. President Donald Trump claimed that Iran was eager for a deal and that negotiations had begun. He referred to the U.S. strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities earlier in the year and stated:

“Iran is very eager for a deal. I’m completely open to it. We are negotiating, and the process has started. It would be good to reach an agreement.”

Shortly afterward, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei dismissed these claims as fabrications. In a nationally televised speech on November 27, he said the Islamic Republic was not seeking “cooperation or relations” with the U.S., calling reports of messages sent through Saudi Arabia “an outright lie.”

Former MP Mostafa Kavakebian complicated the narrative. In a video interview with Asr Iran, he claimed that a letter from President Masoud Pezeshkian to the Saudi Crown Prince included a message for Trump, and that Khamenei had approved it. The Tehran judiciary quickly filed charges against him, labeling his statements false.

This is not the first time such contradictions have emerged. Just one day after Donald Trump claimed Iran wanted a deal, Khamenei responded that the regime’s dispute with the U.S. is “fundamental and intrinsic, not tactical” — reaffirming his long-held opposition to any form of normalization.

These conflicting signals reflect more than political maneuvering — they expose a deep divide within Iran’s leadership on how to ensure the regime’s survival in an increasingly fragile state.

A Crisis of Strategy

The Islamic Republic has suffered serious blows: weakened proxy forces, intelligence setbacks, military losses in the 12-day war, and the collapse of deterrence credibility. The regime’s support for the Gaza conflict, intended to deflect from domestic unrest, may have instead brought the threat of collapse closer.

Within this shifting environment, two rival factions have emerged — each offering a different doctrine for survival.

Competing Survival Doctrines

The Pragmatist Camp

Led by figures like Pezeshkian, former President Rouhani, and economic wings of the IRGC, this camp views the primary threat as domestic — a potential uprising surpassing the 2022 protests. Drivers of this fear include extreme poverty, gender repression, corruption, and youth despair.

Their strategy includes:

De-escalation with the West, particularly the U.S.
Seeking sanctions relief for economic recovery
Allowing limited social reforms to manage discontent
Retaining the regime but softening its image

From this perspective, negotiations are essential. Without diplomacy, they argue, the regime cannot survive.

The Hardline Camp

This faction includes Mojtaba Khamenei, Hossein Taeb, Saeed Jalili, and parts of the Quds Force. They see the core threat as ideological erosion — not street protests.

Their approach:

Equates negotiations, especially with Trump, with surrender
Views any social flexibility as ideological collapse
Emphasizes securitization and increased repression
Rejects reforms as a slippery slope to regime downfall

For hardliners, even minimal compromise signals the beginning of collapse.

Why Talks Are Taboo

The Islamic Republic is built on an anti-Western revolutionary ideology that relies on repression and crisis creation. Slogans like “Death to America” and “Death to Israel” are central to its identity. Genuine diplomacy with the U.S. would challenge that identity and shake the foundations of the regime.

Khamenei understands this. Any negotiation risks exposing the ideological void at the regime’s core. That’s why talks are internally seen as “drinking the poisoned chalice.”

As one hardline newspaper put it: “Enmity with America may be dangerous, but friendship with America is fatal.”

Lessons from History

In 1988, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini accepted a ceasefire in the Iran-Iraq war, calling it “drinking the poisoned chalice.” He feared regime collapse from external and internal threats, especially the People’s Mojahedin Organization (PMOI). To consolidate control, he authorized the execution of over 30,000 political prisoners, mostly belonging to the said organization — a brutal purge that secured his grip on power.

Khamenei’s Dilemma

Today, Ali Khamenei faces a similar reckoning. He knows the regime is vulnerable yet lacks the revolutionary authority or capacity to enact mass purges as Khomeini did. Though executions have risen, the fear-driven legitimacy of the 1980s has waned.

This explains his contradictory posture: exploring quiet talks while denying them publicly. If an agreement is reached, he may frame it as strategic foresight. If not, he preserves ideological consistency. It’s a calculated gamble.

However, today’s Iran is not the Iran of 1988. The PMOI and other opposition networks have developed underground resistance cells across the country. Unlike past uprisings, these forces are organized, prepared, and capable of turning unrest into a sustained movement.

Conclusion

Khamenei’s contradictory rhetoric is more than mixed messaging — it reflects the existential crisis at the heart of the Islamic Republic. Whether the regime chooses pragmatism or ideological rigidity, the forces aligned against it — both internal and external — are growing stronger.

But this time, the stakes are higher. Organized resistance, still led by the People’s Mojahedin Organization, has spread its influence across the country, with thousands of resistance units poised to ignite a renewed uprising.

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